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CASE COMMENTS
The limitations imposed upon deductibility of claims based upon a
promise or agreement would seem to have been inserted primarily to
prevent collusive arrangements to avoid tax liability. The probability of
a taxpayer's resorting to such an extreme device as divorce to avoid pay-
ment of estate taxes is remote. In analyzing the purpose of the legislation
the court said, at page 555, "Divorce decrees are not collusive but ad-
versary in their nature. Such decrees do not subvert Congressional intent
because the dower or curtesy interest of a spouse would not and could
not survive the divorce, and, therefore, would never be included in gross
estate under the statute in question." A man may bave much different
and ordinarily stronger reasons for wishing that his spouse no longer
live with him as his wife than for wishing that she not live as his widow
after him, and the same danger of over-generosity to induce the desired
result accordingly does not exist in the two cases. The present decision
conforms with the general purpose of the relevant legislation and
achieves a desirable result. But cf. Comment (1942) 56 HARv. L. RItv.
314.
J. G. H.
TAxATIoN-ExcIsE ON GAsOLINE-PRIOR PAYMENT AS CONDITION
TO REFUND.-T was a distributor of gasoline both before and after July
1, 1939, the effective date of the statute substantially amending the prior
gasoline tax system and which is the basis of the present system. W. Va.
Acts 1939, c. 125. The former tax scheme had, as to distributors, given an
option as to the time of accrual of liability, one alternative, which was
elected by T being that liability should accrue at the time of sale. The
amended tax scheme provided for accrual of liability at the time of pro-
duction or receipt of the gasoline with respect to which the tax was im-
posed, W.VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 11, art. 14, §3, a provision
which the court construed as imposing liability on account of gasoline
theretofore acquired by distributors as of July 1, 1939, the effective date
of the act, with respect to stocks theretofore acquired and actually held
by distributors on that date. T had a considerable stock of gasoline on
July 1, to which additions and from which withdrawals for sale were
made in the next few months. On October 19, there was a loss by break-
age in the storage tanks of 44,588 gallons. T paid taxes on account of all
gasoline acquired by it between July 1 and October 19, and all gasoline
held in stock on July 1, except for a sum substantially equivalent to the
taxes attributable to the 44,588 gallons lost by breakage, as to which
amount it asserted a claim of nonliability, relying on the statutory provi-
sion for refund to distributors on amounts paid for gasoline lost by speci.
1
B.: Taxation--Excise on Gasoline--Prior Payment as Condition to Refun
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1946
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
fled hazards, including breakage, in the event of prescribed notification
and affidavit of loss by claimant distributor. Proceeding by the state by
notice of motion for the unpaid balance of taxes to which T demurred
and filed a special plea, a plea of accord and satisfaction, and notice of
setoff. Held, that the statutory relief was exclusive and was available only
as a refund for taxes paid and not to defeat or coridition the state's right
to recover unpaid taxes. State v. Penn Oak Oil & Gas Co., Inc., 36 S. E.
(2d) 595 (W.Va. 1945).
The court's position was embodied in its statement, "the word 're-
fund' in the sense it is used in the statute means a return of money
previously paid. Failure of the defendant to pay the tax, which, in our
opinion, was legally chargeable against it, creates an insuperable barrier
to any refund." Id. at 600. The taxpayer w~s limited to the remedy spe-
cifically provided by statute for those in his position and could not assert
others not within its terms.
In so holding, the court would seem to be supported by the meager
body of earlier authorities. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has
held that an overpayment must appear before refund is authorized,
United States v. Factors & Finance Co., 288 U. S. 89, 53 S. Ct. 387, 77
L. ed. 633 (1933), and has applied a similar principle under somewhat
different circumstances in distinguishing a "claim for abatement" from
a claim for refund on the basis that the former has relation to taxes as-
sessed but unpaid. Rock Island, Arkansas & Louisiana R. R. v. United
States, 254 U. S. 141, 41 S. Ct. 55, 65 L. ed. 188 (1920).
The result is to require payment of the tax and initiation of an in-
dependent proceeding by the taxpayer. However consistent this may be
with the prior authorities, it is opposed to the general policies for avoid-
ing circuity of action, multiplicity of suits, inconvenience, and expense
to suitors and avoidable waste of the court's energies which have histor-
ically supported in succession extensions of equitable jurisdiction,
MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF EQurry (1936) §44, real-party-in-interest
statutes, Clark & Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest (1925) 34 YALE
L. J. 239, the broadening of setoff and counterclaim, Millar, Nvotabilia of
American Civil Procedure, 1887-1937 (1937) 50 HAnv. L. REv. 1017,
1025, et seq., and the adoption of declaratory judgment proceed-
ings, BORCrHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (2d ed. 1941) c. IV. Revi-
sion of the former federal tax procedure, by which the taxpayer had in
all events to pay and then to bring a separate court proceeding for
amounts as to which he denied liability, a procedure which bred attempts
at tax avoidance, so as to permit a predetermination of liability before
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payment was motivated by the considerations mentioned. BiKPOc)rD,
COURT PROCEDURE IN FEDERAL TAX CASES (1928) 3.
Popular, professional, and legislative recognition of the desirability
of expeditious determination of an entire controversy in a single proceed-
ing, in causes involving private litigants, has been widespread. The same
considerations would seem applicable in matters between the taxpayer
and the state. To the private citizen, even the payment of taxes justly
due is a painful necessity and payments of amounts for which he is not
liable will tend to render the tax system doubly odious and to make the
ways of courts and judicial proceedings seem incomprehensible and un-
worthy of support. See Report of the Standing Committee on Federal
Taxation (1938) 63 A. B. A. REP. 245 at 252, 253. Part of the justifica-
tion for the result attained in the instant case is the well-recognized doc-
trine requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies (GELLHORN,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS (1940) 793 et seq.) ; but
that doctrine which ordinarily operates to speed and simplify the disposi-
tion of claims has the contrary effect in the situation here presented.
In view of the court's understandable reluctance to depart from a
position so grounded on prior authority, it is submitted that the legisla-
ture should amend the statute to provide a more flexible and compre-
hensive manner of relieving taxpayers from payment of amounts for
which they are not ultimately liable.
L. J. B.
TAXATIoN-ExEMPTIONS-INCOME-PRODUCING REAL PROPERTY
OF CHARITY.-A business section containing a hotel building, in the
downtown section of Huntington, was conveyed to trustees in trust for a
charity. The trustees leased the property and applied the rentals exclu-
sively to charitable purposes pursuant to the trust. The assessor proposed
to omit the property from the assessment list on the ground that it was ex-
empt because of the beneficial ownership and receipt of income by the
charity. Mandamus by a real estate firm owning similar properties to
compel the assessor to list the property for taxation. Held, writ granted;
under the West Virginia constitutional provision exempting from the
taxation property "used" by a charitable organization, W. VA. CONST.
art. X, §1, the exemption is limited in the case of real property to pro-
perty held for actual use and occupancy of the charity, and the statute
purporting to extend the exemption to properties the income from which
is received by the corporation and applied exclusively to charitable pur-
poses is unconstitutional to the extent it makes such extension. Central
Realty Co. v. Martin, 30 S. E. (2d) 720 (W. Va. 1944).
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